p2pnet.net News:- The Big Four Organized Music family has been victimizing its own customers since at least 2003. But instead of vigorously questioning the bizarre practice, the mainstream on- and offline print and electronic media support it, parroting floods of Big Four so-called press releases as though they’re accurate reports from credible sources.

New York lawyer Ray Beckerman runs Recording Industry vs The People which among other things, high-lights some of the worst examples of how the music industry cartel persecutes men, women and even children. The site also carries links to court documents and lists lawyers who are currently defending Big Four victims.

The labels have numerous faux ‘trade’ units fronting for them and in the US, it’s the mis-named RIAA (Recording Industry Association of America) owned by EMI (Great Britain), Vivendi Universal (France) Sony BMG (Japan and Germany) and, finally, Warner Music (US).

Here’s Beckerman’s latest on the RIAA in Action.

The RIAA lawsuits pit a small number of very large recording companies against individuals who have paid for an internet access account.

On the plaintiff’s end, the owners of the underlying copyrights in the musical compositions are not involved in the case; neither are many smaller record companies.

As to the defendants, since no investigation is made to ascertain that the defendant is actually someone who engaged in peer to peer file sharing of copyrighted music without authorization, there are many defendants who have no idea why they are being sued and who did nothing even arguably violative of anyone’s copyright. Defendants have included people who have never even used a computer, and many people who although they have used a computer, have never engaged in any peer to peer file sharing.

Sometimes the cases are misleadingly referred to as cases against ‘downloaders’; in fact the RIAA knows nothing of any downloading when it commences suit, and in many instances no downloading ever took place.

It is more accurate to refer to the cases as cases against persons who paid for internet access which the RIAA has reason to believe was used by some person — possibly the defendant, possibly someone else — to engage in peer to peer file sharing.

Ex parte discovery cases.

At the core of the RIAA lawsuit process, is its initial lawsuit against a group of “John Does”.

Here is how it works:

A lawsuit is brought against a group of “John Does”. The location of the lawsuit is where the corporate headquarters of the internet service provider (ISP) is located.

All the RIAA knows about the people it is suing is that they are the people who paid for an internet access acount for a particular dynamic IP address.

The “John Does” may live — and usually do live — hundreds or thousands of miles away from the City where the lawsuit is pending, and are not even aware that they have been sued.

The RIAA is aware that most of the defendants do not live in the state, and are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, but bring the case anyway.

They are also aware that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure there is no basis for joining all these defendants in a single lawsuit, but do indeed join them in one case, sometimes as many as several hundred in a single “litigation”.

The only “notice” the “John Does” get is a vague letter from their ISP, along with copies of an ex parte discovery order and a subpoena, indicating that an order has already been granted against them: i.e., instead of receiving notice that the RIAA is applying for an order, they instead are notified that they have already lost the motion, without ever even having known of its existence.[p2pnet emphasis]

They are not given copies of (i) the summons and complaint, (ii) the papers upon which the Court granted the ex parte discovery order, or (iii) the court rules needed to defend themselves. Most recipients of this “notice” do not even realize that it means that there is a lawsuit against them. None of the recipients of the “notice” have any idea what they are being sued for, or what basis the Court had for granting the ex parte discovery order and for allowing the RIAA to obtain a subpoena.

They are told they have a few days, or maybe a week or two, to make a motion to quash the subpoena. But if they were to talk to a lawyer they could not give the lawyer an iota of information as to what the case is about, what the basis for the subpoena is, or any other details that would permit a lawyer to make an informed decision as to whether a motion to quash the subpoena could, or could not, be made. What is more, the lawyer would have to be admitted to practice in the jurisdiction in which the ex parte case is pending, in order to do anything at all.

In other words, except for lawyers who are knowledgeable about the RIAA tactics, no lawyer could possibly have any suggestions that would enable “John Doe” to fight back.

So “John Doe” of course defaults. Then the John Doe “case” may drag on for months or even years, with the RIAA being the only party that has lawyers in court to talk to the judges and other judicial personnel.

The RIAA — without notice to the defendants — makes a motion for an “ex parte” order permitting immediate discovery. (”Ex parte” means that one side has communicated to the Court without the knowledge of the other parties to the suit. It is very rarely permitted, since the American system of justice is premised upon an open system in which, whenever one side wants to communicate with the Court, it has to give prior notice to the other side, so that they too will have an opportunity to be heard.).

The “ex parte” order would give the RIAA permission to take “immediate discovery” — before the defendants have been served or given notice — which authorizes the issuance of subpoenas to the ISP’s asking for the names and addresses and other information about their subscribers, which is information that would otherwise be confidential.

In the United States the courts have been routinely granting these “ex parte” orders, it appears. (Not so in other countries. Both Canada and the Netherlands have found the RIAA’s investigation too flimsy to warrant the invasion of subscriber privacy. Indeed the Netherlands court questioned the investigation’s legality.).

Once the ex parte order is granted, the RIAA issues a subpoena to the ISP, and gets the subscriber’s name and address.

The RIAA then discontinues its “John Doe” “ex parte” case, and sues the defendant in his own name in the district where he or she lives.

Thus, at the core of the whole process are:

(1) the mass lawsuit against a large number of “John Does”;
(2) the “ex parte” order of discovery; and
(3) the subpoenas demanding the names and addresses of the “John Does”.

This process has recently come under attack in 3 cases in Manhattan federal court: Atlantic v. Does 1-25 before Judge Swain, Motown v. Does 1-99 before Judge Buchwald, and Warner v. Does 1-149, before Judge Owen, in which “John Doe” defendants represented by Ray Beckerman and Ty Rogers brought motions to (a) vacate the ex parte discovery order on the ground that it had not been supported by competent evidence of a prima facie copyright infringment case, (b) quash the subpoena on that ground plus the additional ground that the complaint fails to state a claim for relief, and (c) sever and dismiss as to all defendants other than John Doe #1.

The moving parties were from Iowa, Texas, Long Island, and North Carolina — i.e. not one of the John Does was someone who could properly be sued in Manhattan federal court.

All 3 motions have been denied.

The decisions are not appealable, since they are, theoretically, “interlocutory”. However, it is the RIAA’s usual practice to discontinue the “John Doe” cases, which means that there will never be a final judgment in the case, so the orders will never be brought to appellate scrutiny.

Settlement phase

After getting the name and address of the person who paid for the internet access account, they then send him or her a letter demanding a “settlement”.

Their settlement is usually for $3750, non-negotiable, and contains numerous one-sided and unusual provisions, such as a representation that peer to peer file sharing of copyrighted music is a copyright infringement (a representation that is far too broad, undoubtedly there are ’sharing’ behaviors with digital files, as there are with cd’s, that are not copyright infringements). Even certain innocuous provisions, worded in a way to make them obligations of the defendant but not the RIAA, are deemed ‘non-negotiable’. At bottom, the settlement is cold comfort to the defendant, because it does not speak for the other potential plaintiffs — the owners of the copyrighted work, or the other record companies not represented by the RIAA litigation fund.

Litigations against named defendants

If there is no settlement, the RIAA then commences suit against the named defendant in the district in which he or she resides. A boilerplate complaint is used which accuses the defendant of “downloading, distributing, and/or making available for distribution” a list of songs. There are actually 2 lists, a long list (exhibit B) and a short list (exhibit A). The long list is a ’screen shot’ of a list of file names which were allegedly in a shared files folder. The short list is allegedly a list of song which the RIAA’s investigators were able to download.

No details as to how, when, or where the alleged “infringement” took place.

If the defendant defaults, plaintiffs apply for, and apparently usually obtain, a default judgement for $750 per Exhibit A song — a number which is over 1000 times the 70-cent amount for which the license to the song could have been purchased. This measure of damages has been challenged on constitutional grounds in UMG v. Lindor and Maverick v. Goldshteyn, both in Brooklyn federal court.

There have been several challenges to the sufficiency of the boilerplate complaint, in the form of a motion to dismiss complaint, 3 in Texas, 1 in Minnesota, 1 in Arizona, and 3 in New York; my firm has been involved in the 3 New York motions.

In Elektra v. Santangelo, in Westchester, the motion was denied.

An unusal result occurred in Interscope v. Duty, in Arizona. The judge denied the defendant’s dismissal motion, not because he agreed with the RIAA, but because he didn’t feel he understood the technology well enough to rule on the case.

Then, in Waco, Texas, in Warner v. Payne, in Fonovisa v. Alvarez in Abilene, Texas, and in Maverick v. Goldshteyn in Brooklyn, New York, the judges followed the Interscope decision, declining to decide whether ‘making available’ is a copyright infringement, and upheld the complaint. The motion was also denied in Arista v. Greubel, in Dallas, Texasa.

In Elektra v. Barker in Manhattan, the motion is pending, and the RIAA has cited to the judge their victories in the other six (6) cases.

In Elektra v. Barker, amicus curiae briefs have been submitted by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Computer & Communications Industry Association, and the Internet Industry Association, in support of Ms. Barker’s motion, and by the MPAA in opposition to it. Additionally the American Association of Publishers requested permission to file such a brief, and the United States Department of Justice submitted a “Statement of Interest” taking issue with an argument made by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Briefing has now been completed, and the parties are awaiting either a decision from Judge Karas, or the setting of an oral argument date if the judge feels that oral argument is needed.

The Department of Justice also submitted a “Statement of Interest” in Fonovisa, also on the side of the RIAA, relating to the same limited issue.

A new dismissal motion motion is being made in Westchester, in Warner v. Cassin.

In cases where the sufficiency of the complaint is not being challenged, or has been accepted by the court, the RIAA serves a number of pretrial discovery requests, calling for examination of the hard drive and numerous other items, and discovery is being litigated. There have been interesting discovery rulings in Elektra v. Santangelo in White Plains, Atlantic v. Andersen in Oregon, Motown v. Nelson in Michigan, and in UMG v. Lindor.

In Lindor the magistrate ordered the record companies to produce evidence, if any, relating to their employees’ use of p2p file sharing to send music files to radio stations, and to produce ‘chain of title’ documents for any copyrights as to which the name of the plaintiff is not the name on the copyright registration, or as to which there has ever been any dispute of copyright ownership. Additionally, he ordered that defendant can take pretrial discovery into the plaintiffs’ analysis of the hard drive, and precluded plaintiffs from proving any actual damages at trial.

Some of the other discovery rulings in Lindor: (1) the record companies can’t have a blanket advance confidentiality order for their deposition transcripts, but will have to move for a protective order as to sections they want to keep confidential, (2) if they want to assert a privilege as to their agreements with their investigators they will have to make a formal protective order motion and submit copies of the agreements “in camera” to the Judge (i.e. show them it to the judge, but not to the other side), (3) if they won’t produce the witness for UMG in Brooklyn, where the court is located, they have to either reimburse Ms. Lindor up to $500 for her lawyer’s travel expenses or they have to have a videoconference where both lawyers are participating only by videoconference; (4) Ms. Lindor is entitled to followup interrogatories on the subject of the plaintiffs’ ‘investigation’ methods.

In Priority Records v. Brittany Chan, a Michigan case, the litigation was brought against a 14 year old girl who allegedly engaged in file sharing when she was 13. The RIAA made a motion to have a guardian ad litem appointed so that its case might proceed against the minor, but the Judge rejected the motion because it did not ensure payment of the guardian ad litem’s fees. The judge thereafter dismissed the case when the RIAA ignored his instruction to submit a plan that would ensure payment of the guardian ad litem’s fees.

In an earlier case against Brittany’s mother, the RIAA refused to withdraw the case against the mother, but then changed its mind and did withdraw when faced with the mother’s motion for summary judgment and attorneys fees.

A similar scenario occurred in Capitol v. Foster, in Oklahoma, where the RIAA withdrew only when faced with the mother’s motion for summary judgment and attorneys fees. The judge let the RIAA drop its case, but held that the ‘voluntary’ withdrawal did not make the RIAA immune from legal fees, and indicated that he may award the mother her attorneys fees. Ms. Foster has made a motion for attorneys fees, and was supported in her motion by an amicus curiae brief submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the American Association of Law Libraries, Public Citizen, and the ACLU Foundation of Oklahoma. In their brief the ‘friends of the court’ told the judge that “the RIAA has wrought havoc in the lives of many innocent Americans” and that an award of attorneys fees is necessary to deter such conduct in the future. Meanwhile the RIAA has asked the judge not to accept the amicus brief.

In another Oklahoma City case, Warner v. Stubbs, the defendant — represented by the same lawyer who represented Debbie Foster — filed an answer and counterclaim saying that the RIAA’s tactics amounted to extortion. The very next day the RIAA moved to withdraw its case.

In a Michigan case, Warner v. Scantlebury, after learning that the defendant died, the RIAA asked the Court for a 60-day stay to allow the family to “grieve”, after which it said it intends to take depositions of the decedent’s children. We have received unconfirmed reports that after a firestorm of controversy erupted over the internet, the RIAA now intends to withdraw the case against the deceased.

As of this writing, we are on the verge of seeing how defendants’ summary judgment motions will fare in the courts. In February, 2006, Marie Lindor wrote a letter to Judge Trager asking for a premotion conference in connection with her planned summary judgment motion in UMG v. Lindor; the judge, however, referred the case to the Magistrate for pretrial discovery prior to summary judgment motion practice. After submitting to a deposition, and to an inspection of the hard drive of the computer in her apartment, after answering all of the RIAA’s written discovery demands, and after arranging for her adult son and daughter to testify voluntarily at their depositions, she has now written to the Judge renewing her request for a summary judgment pre-motion conference and for a stay of discovery during the pendency of the motion. In August, 2006, a motion for summary judgment was made by the defendant, in Chicago, in Warner v. Wilke. The plaintiffs’ opposition papers are due September 19th.

Stay tuned.

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