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20 Responses to “US judge criticizes Net libel suits”

1. Reader's Write Says:
   September 13th, 2006 at 12:39 am

   Thanks so much for posting this.

   I wanted to let you know I logged in and it let me post but not with my log in name.

   This discussion expanded upon here:

   http://p2pnet.net/story/9840.

   Ilena Rosenthal
   www.BreastImplantAwareness.org/QuackbustersVsIlena.htm

   www.BreastImplantAwareness.org/Polevoy.htm

2. Reader's Write Says:
   September 13th, 2006 at 2:32 am

   I believe such lawsuits are quite ignorant and are a waste of time, what happens if you are in Russia and post such a comment that will cause a lawyer to jump up or two, but only in America? Such cases are headaches, and unless the information that is written is extremely serious then lawsuits such as these are pointless and do no cause.

3. Reader's Write Says:
   September 15th, 2006 at 2:34 am

   from the BBC article, looks like Canadian, UK and Australian sites like p2pnet are toast! The protections may exist in the usa, but looks like seeing as though p2pnet didn\’t not remove the offending articles and others this case looks like a slam dunk -

4. Reader's Write Says:
   September 15th, 2006 at 6:49 pm

   I disagree.

   Please quote the exact phrase which leads you to your assumption.

   http://www.BreastImplantAwareness.org/Polevoy.htm

   http://www.BreastImplantAwareness.org/QuackWatchWatch.htm

5. Reader's Write Says:
   September 15th, 2006 at 10:06 pm

   Don’t listen to that one Ilena,

   That’s our pet troll Gachnar.
   he has some sort of personal vendetta against Jon,
   ( or just some very deep rooted mental problems. )

   As he well knows, Jon removed the POSTS referred to immediately
   on notification ( Their not suing about the article, otherwise they
   would have to sue half a dozen major news outlets that carried the
   same article ). It’s not Jon’s problem that those posts were able
   to be read through the Google Cache ( so sue Google ).
   They are also trying to sue Jon for the Identity of an anonymous
   poster, something that Jon has know way of knowing.

   If you like, I have a copy of the lawsuit ( publicly, legally available
   on the internet ), and archives of all of the posts in question.
   No opinions or edtiorials, just the raw facts.

   Gachnar is named for the “Fear Demon” in an episode of
   Buffy the Vampire Slayer.
   Tiny, ineffectual, tacky …. squished.

   Dreddsnik
   ByocottRIAA.com

6. Reader's Write Says:
   September 16th, 2006 at 11:05 pm

   ever heard of a proxy chase… you will soon… there is no anonymity on the web…

7. Reader's Write Says:
   September 17th, 2006 at 12:17 am
   
8. Reader's Write Says:
   September 17th, 2006 at 12:31 am

   “shivers*

   lol

9. Reader's Write Says:
   September 17th, 2006 at 2:21 am

   Your comments about the ‘lack of authority” cited is the reason why this case was before the California Supreme Court. in otherwords, if there was a great deal of authority, why would the Supreme Court of California bother to hear the case?
   Equally misleading is your comment about how Grell’s arguments were “bombing”. Apparently, you failed to read the Appellate Court’s ruling. Not only does this Appellate Court’s decision support Grell’s position, it found that Grell’s argument’s were meritorious based on the rules that are suppose to be followed by Courts when interpreting a statute, like Section 230 of The Communication Deccency Act, especially when the statute involves competing constitutional rights such as free speech and the right to petition for redress when ones reputation is falsely attacked by statements that are false. Indeed, know one supporting immunity bothered to mentioned that the statements that were reposted and republished by Ms Rosenthal, were already found by the trial court to be libelous per se.
   The trail court found that not only were the statements accusing Dr. Polevoy of “stalking” false, the trial court found that the statements Ms Rosenthal reposted over and over, were made with mailice by the original publisher. The fact that Ms Rosenthal continues to claim that her republication of this libelous article was justified is additional proof of the lengths that this woman will go to distort the truth for her own benfit.
   As for the issue of immunity, your comments neglect to mention the findings of the Appellate Court’s 50 page decision holding that Congress did not intend to bestow absolute immunity to Internet providers and users who knowing repost libelous statements and/or knowing allow libelous publication to remain online after the provider or user has been told that the publication is false.
   Your article also fails to mention that Internet libel is not the only issue that immunity can effect. For example, there are several cases where Internet users are trying to use Section 230 to protect themselves against liability for discriminatory housing ads that are being posted online. If these discriminatory ads were published anywhere else, they would violate the Fair housing Act.

   No doubt that the same issue will arise when discriminatory employment want ads are publsihed. Did Congress intend to grant immunity to users and providers, who under any other situation, would be liable for their discriminatory conduct?
   Online discrimination and libel are only two of the absurd results that will occur if immunity is granted to users and providers who knowing post or republish such material. Think about it. What will happen if someone hacks into confidential medical records and posts them online and get reposted by another person. If immunity is granted, no one who reposts these records and no provider who allows these records to remain online, will have any liability for not removing the records no matter how much evidence is presented that the records invade a persons privacy.

   As noted in the Appellate decision, which, was the only published case to actually analyse section 230 consistent with the rules applicable to statutory interpretation, the legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood.
   As noted by the Court ‘We would not lightly require the State to abandon this purpose, for, as Mr. Justice Stewart has reminded us, the individual’s right to the protection of his own good name ‘reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being–a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional system.’ (Rosenblatt v. Baer (1966) 383 U.S. 75, 92 (conc. opn.).’ ” (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 341 (Gertz).)
   The Appellate case also concluded that the Court’s analysis in the Zeran case, flies in the face of this admonition.
   Zeran also flies in the face of well established rules of statutory interpretation especially statutory interpretation involving competing intersecting Constitutional rights.
   For example, the Zeran Court’s interpretation of §230 fails to balance a person’s free speech rights, if any, against another person’s’ rights of petition for libel, two equally protected provisions under both the United States and California constitution. (See Rosenblatt v. Baer (1965) 383 US 75, 86 S.Ct 669, 675 “…Society has a persuasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation”).
   As noted by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion,
   “The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional system.
   Where is the decency in allowing unbridled Internet republications of defamatory statements?
   In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 749 105 S.Ct. 2939, 2943, the Court held that the State’s interest in compensating private individuals against defamatory statements was “strong and legitimate” and that “a state should not be lightly required to abandon it”.
   Is there any evidence to suggest that in enacting §230, Congress intended to eliminate that aspect of state law holding a republisher of a defamatory statement immune from liability or to eliminate individual rights not to be defamed?
   As noted in McCoy v. Hearst Corporation (1986) Cal. 3d 835, 856:
   “Libel laws recognize that each person has a right not to be disparaged by false statements. (citation omitted) Society’s interest in redressing the harm done to one’s reputation is strong. (citation omitted) Moreover, this court is not unmindful that “[t]he harm done to one’s reputation by erroneous charges of corruption or dishonesty can never be fully undone, … For even an erased question mark still suffices to raise the question, where perhaps none existed before.” (Bird, The Role of the press in the First Amendment Society (1980) 20 Santa Clara L.Rev. 1, 8.
   Good Character, or reputation, consists of the general opinion of people respecting one. It is built up by a lifetime of conduct. It is probably the dearest possession that a man has, and once lost is almost impossible to regain. The possession of a good reputation is conducive to happiness in life and contentment. The loss of it, … brings shame, misery and heartache. (citation omitted.”

   Another rule of statutory interpretation requires that the Court “‘select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating thegeneral purpose of the statute, and to avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.’ . .” Guillemin v. Stein
   As noted in Welton v. Los Angeles (1976) 18 Cal.3d 497, “a statute should be construed so as to avoid conflict with the Constitution. The court should construe the enactment so as to limit its effect and operation to matters that may be constitutionally regulated or prohibited.” (Supra at 505.)
   Second, “that judicial construction must not create uncertainty inhibiting exercise of a constitutional right.”
   In McCoy v. Heart Corporation (1986) 42 Cal.3d 835, 856 the Court stated that:
   “Society’s interest in redressing the harm done to one’s reputation is strong. (citation omitted) Moreover, this court is not unmindful that “[t]he harm done to one’s reputation by erroneous charges of corruption or dishonesty can never be fully undone, … For even an erased question mark still suffices to raise the question, where perhaps none existed before.” (Bird,
   “Good Character, or reputation, consists of the general opinion of people respecting one. It is built up by a lifetime of conduct. It is probably the dearest possession that a man has, and once lost is almost impossible to regain. The possession of a good reputation is conducive to happiness in life and contentment. The loss of it, … brings shame, misery and heartache. ”

   Another rule of statutory interpretation that the Zeran Court never considered is set out in DeYoung v. San Diego (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 17. In this case, the Court pointed out that one fundamental rule of statutory construction is togive significance, if possible, to every word or part, and harmonize the parts considering a particular clause or section in the context of the whole.
   How does absolute immunity harmonize the competing Constitutional rights of defamation and the right to petition?
   How does absolute immunity harmonize the competing federal laws that can be violated if absolute immunity is found.
   Another factor to consider is legislation on the same subject,
   Here we have 47 USC Section 223 which reads like this: “Whoever…utilizes any device or software that can be used to originate telecommunications or other types of communications that are transmitted, in whole or in part, by the Internet… without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person…who receives the communications…shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than two years, or bothpublic policy, violation of federal and State laws against discrimination.
   Absolute immunity would contradict what Congress intended to do when it passed Section 223.
   Under the rules of statutory interpretation, if the terms of a statute are by fair and reasonable interpretation capable of a meaning consistent with the requirements of the Constitution, the statute will be given that meaning, rather than another in conflict with the Constitution. Consequently, if feasible within bounds set by their words and purposes, statutes should be construed to preserve their constitutionality. This follows from the presumption that the legislative body intended to enact a valid statute. The rule in favor of a construction which upholds a statute’s validity plainly must mean that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, the court’s duty is to adopt the latter.
   If immunity is granted, a “clever libeler” could easily escape liability by having some other Internet user who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, or who is anonymous, or who is judgment proof, publish libelous statements which another “Internet user” is free to republish.
   In addition to destroying a person’s right to seek petition for redress against a person or entity that knowing allows another person to post, publish or report defamatory remarks, a finding that section 230 bestows absolute immunity on an ISP or user of an interactive computer service, will allow the ISP and/or user to escape liability for publications that invade a person’s privacy, false advertising and similar laws that would in any other situation be violated.
   How can a finding of absolute immunity be harmonized with these other laws?
   In the Appellate decision, the Court concluded that absolute immunity can not be harmonized. As noted by the Court, ‘Because section 230 does not “’speak directly’ to the question addressed by the common law” and is capable of more than one construction, we conclude that the statute should not be interpreted as having abrogated the common law principle of distributor or knowledge-based liability.”
   The fact that so many other cases have found immunity does not make them right. See Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 620 [A decision “is not authority for everything said in the . . . opinion but only ‘for the points actually involved and actually decided’ “].) The absence of any analysis renders this dictum unpersuasive. (See People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 915 [” ‘we must view with caution seemingly categorical directives not essential to earlier decisions and be guided by this dictum only to the extent it remains analytically persuasive’
   Moreover, the Appellate Court concluded that the speculative conclusion of the Zeran court that exposing Internet intermediaries to knowledge-based liability would significantly chill online speech is disputed by the speculations of other authorities. fn. 14 We set forth the views of some of the commentators who disagree with Zeran on this point solely to illustrate the nature of the ongoing debate
   And at least one commentator who agrees that intermediary liability may chill online speech does not believe an absolute immunity is the appropriate response, because such a complete protection not only “ignores the power that the Internet gives irresponsible speakers to damage the reputations of their targets,” but also “underestimates the benefits that defamation law may bring to Internet discourse.” (Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace (2000) 49 Duke L.J. 855, 865.) Emphasizing that defamation law exerts a “civilizing influence” that makes meaningful public a “civilizing influence” that makes meaningful public discourse possible (id. at p. 886, citing Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution (1986) 74 Cal. L.Rev. 691, 713 and Post, Constitutional Domains (1995)), Professor Lidsky maintains that completely protecting Internet intermediaries who disseminate injurious speech deters citizens fearful of injury from engaging in Internet discourse and exacerbates “the largest single threat to meaningful discourse in cyberspace: incoherence.”

   A review of the Communication Decency Act history suggests that the reason for §230 stems from the fact that the electronic transmission of information created a substantial opportunity to distribute false information.
   Prior to the enactment of §230, courts considering defamation claims involving Internet information service providers tended to look to the service provided and then analogize it to traditional legal categories. For example, under the common law, one who only delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person, i.e., “a distributor” was subject to liability only if he knows, or has reason to know, of its defamatory character. (Restatement of the Law (Second) Torts § 581(1), p. 231, (1977)). In contrast, one who republished a libel was subject to liability as if he had originally published the statement. Thus, a republisher of defamatory material is treated as a “publisher” of the material under the common law.

   Congress’ decision to enact §230 and establish a distinction between parties who distributed defamatory statements and those that published them was further influenced by two cases: Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., (776 F.Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., (1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. (1995)). The plaintiffs in Cubby sued CompuServe, a computer information service that users could access from a computer. The plaintiffs accused CompuServe of posting defamatory statements about them on its computer service in a publication that CompuServe had posted for a third party. CompuServe moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was a distributor, and not a publisher, of the defamatory statements at issue. Accordingly, CompuServe argued, it could not be held liable because it did not know or have reason to know of the defamatory statements.

   In short, the unambiguous language of §230 reveals that the legislative intent behind civil liability immunity was to protect Internet services providers and other similar types of Internet users, from liability on “account of” “any action taken in good faith to restrict access to material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, harassing or otherwise objectionable whether or not such material is constitutionally protected,” not a user who engages in the willful act of republishing libelous statements.
   Consequently, granting immunity to any individual Internet user who intentionally republishes defamatory material, like Rosenthal, is contrary to 1) the legislative intent and 2) the constitutional protection afforded to individuals and to states charged with protecting its citizens against injury to their reputation.

   The very title of the law, i.e., “The Communication Decency Act” is also inconsistent with absolute immunity. In other words, where is the “Decency” in granting Internet users immunity for libelous republications?
   Finally, to uphold such an interpretation would also lead to absurd results since such a user could even profit from the defamatory message being spread, as the reputation of the hapless subject of the defamatory message is further harmed by the message’s continued propagation. Indeed, even if such a defamed plaintiff were to recover from the original author of a defamatory message, there would still be no incentive whatsoever for a malicious republisher to stop spreading the false, defamatory message.
   As noted by the Appellate Court, Legislative use of the legally uncertain word “publisher” is simply too flimsy a basis upon which to grant providers and users of interactive computer services what amounts to an “absolute protection” requiring the “total sacrifice of the competing value served by the law of defamation” and”” the _subordination of “a concept at_ the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.” (Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at p.
   Because section 230 does not “’speak directly’ to the question addressed by the common law” (United States v. Texas, supra, 507 U.S. 529, 534), and is capable of more than one construction, we conclude that the statute should not be interpreted as having abrogated the common law principle of distributor or knowledge-based liability
   Indeed, one could argue from the enumeration of publisher and speaker in § 230(c)(1) that distributor was deliberately omitted.” (Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230, supra, 61 Alb. L.Rev. 147, 162.) [FN 10
   Contrary to your claim the Grell’s arguments were bombing, in the Appellate decision, the Court noted that “the view of most scholars who have addressed the issue is that Zeran ’s analysis of section 230 is flawed, in that the court ascribed to Congress an intent to create a far broader immunity than that body actually had in mind or is necessary to achieve its purposes. [FN 8] We share that view. Cognizant that, “while federal circuit court precedence on issues of federal law is certainly entitled to substantial deference, it is not binding” (Yee v. City of Escondido (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1349, 1351, affd. (1992) 503 U.S. 519; accord, 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 942, p. 983), we decline to accept Zeran ’s construction of the statute. [FN 9]
   Indeed, a strict reading of section 230 shows that the only thing unambiguously communicated by the entire text of section 230 is a prohibition on the imposition of primary publisher liability on providers and users who act to restrict access to offensive or injurious materials. fn. 11 Because the statute does not clearly indicate an intention to [114 Cal.App.4th 1400] abrogate the common law principle of distributor liability, it is appropriate to inquire whether the legislative history demonstrates such an intention. (People v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1075; American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 480, 487-488; Lewis v. Ryan (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 330, 333.)
   In the Legislative history of Section 230 Congress overruled Stratton Oakmont because it wanted “to remove the disincentives to self regulation” created by the decision. (Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d. at p. 331
   As Zeran acknowledges (129 F.3d at p. 331), the committee report pertaining to section 230 indicates only that the statute was designed to overrule Stratton Oakmont,
   in short, in the Legislative History of Section 230, the legislative purpose and intent was to over rule the Stratton Oakmont case where liability was based on original publisher liability. The legislature, familiar with Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. (S.D.N.Y.1991) 776 F.Supp. 135 does not mention of this case in the legialative history. Cubby liability was based on distributor liability.
   In short, Congress intended to encourage ISPs to monitor the content on the Internet, but if ISPs are granted absolute immunity for disseminating third-party defamatory material, then ISPs will not bother to screen their content at all because they will never be subject to liability.
   If, on the other hand, ISPs could be held liable as a distributor for neglecting to monitor information or failing to remove objectionable content that is brought to their knowledge, then ISPs would have a greater incentive to screen content.
   Common sense dictates that an ISP will not waste its time and money monitoring content over the Internet when it will suffer no repercussions from failing to do so. Thus, immunizing ISPs from distributor liability would frustrate Congress’s objectives under the CDA much more than would subjecting ISPs to distributor liability.” (Patel, Immunizing Internet Service Providers From Third-
   The stated policy objectives in the plain language and the legislative history of the CDA actually compel the conclusion that Congress intended for ISPs to remain subject to distributor liability in certain contexts. Section 230(b) states that ‘[i]t is the policy of the United States’ to: (1) ‘encourage the development of technologies that maximize user control over what information is received’ over the Internet, and (2) ‘remove disincentives [for ISPs to] develop[ ] and utiliz[e] … blocking and filtering technologies’ in order to facilitate the screening of ‘objectionable’ material displayed over the Internet. In other words, in enacting the CDA, Congress intended to create incentives for ISPs to screen and edit the content of information displayed over the Internet. If ISPs were immune from both publisher and distributor liability in third-party defamation claims, they would essentially be given blanket immunity from liability. This interpretation of the ‘Good Samaritan’ immunity, which is advocated in Zeran, would frustrate, rather than promote the purpose of the CDA. subject to liability.
   Resting on the use of the ambiguous word “publisher” in section 230(c)(1), the Zeran court felt it unnecessary to examine anything else in the text of the statute to determine whether it “speaks directly” to the question addressed by the common law principle of distributor liability.
   This omission is important because the text that the Zeran court failed to examine examination, sheds light on the breadth of the immunity Congress intended to create.
   For example, in the findings and declarations set forth in section 230, Congress discuss’ the “opportunities for cultural development,” and the “myriad avenues for intellectual activity” provided by “the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services” (§ 230(a) & (b)).
   On the otherhand, nowhere in the findings and declarations is there any indication that Congress considered online speech in need of protection.
   Further, there is no expression of general concern for the promotion of speech in section 230(c). As stated in the title of section 230 what Congress did express concern for was the “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material,”
   As clearly stated in Section 230(c)(2), the statute immunizes providers and users against liability on account of action “to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be . . . objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected,” or to provide others “the technical means to restrict access to [such] material . . . .” (§ 230(c)(2)(A) & (B), italics added.)
   The statute makes no reference to immunizing the provider or user of an interactive computer service from liability for publications that would otherwise violate federal law like the Fair housing Act or from injurious publications that the provider and/or user knows is a defamatory, discriminatory, or wrongful publication like false advertisements, and similar kinds of law.
   The fact that there is no mention of immunity for such conduct is both negates the claim that Section 230 bestows absolute immunity on providers and users since such a conclusion would violate virtually every rule of statutory construction especially those rules that are to be applied when competing constitutional rights are at odds.

   As noted in the Appellate decision, Congress does not write upon a clean slate. [Citation.] In order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must ’speak directly’ to the question addressed by the common law. [Citations.]” (United States v. Texas (1993) 507 U.S. 529, 534, italics added; accord, Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 92 [”it should not ‘be presumed that the Legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by necessary implication’”].)
   In sum, a distributor liability rule that encouraged some response by intermediaries would be socially efficient: the benefits from reduced defamation injury would likely greatly exceed the cost of response by intermediaries. Such liability seems particularly critical in online defamation cases, given those factors of cyberspace communication that both encourage production of serious defamation and limit a victim’s ability to bring original authors to account. Not surprisingly, many commentators have agreed that an intermediate form of liability for intermediaries would make the most sense. In fact, almost all of those who commented on Cubby viewed its imposition of distributor liability as the correct legal rule choice.” (Id. at p. 620, fns. omitted; see also Butler, Plotting the Return of an Ancient Tort to Cyberspace, supra, 6 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L.Rev. 247, 272 [explaining why exposure to distributor liability “would do the least harm to the forum for free speech over the Internet”]; Bovenzi, Liability of Systems Operators on the Internet, supra, 11 Berk. Tech. L.J. 93, 139 [knowledge-based liability “would preserve freedom of expression on computer networks”].)
   If my arguments bombed, so did the Appellate Courts. Hopefully, the California Supreme Court will see it differently and not be intimidated by all the major Interent providers who joined forces in support of absolute immunity, for one reason, it would cost them a little more money to make sure that Communication on the Internet retains some amount of Decency.
   Christopher E. Grell

10. Reader's Write Says:
    September 17th, 2006 at 5:36 pm

    Well responded to. People like Jon Newton at p2pnet think they have immunity or the right to make whatever statements they want even when they are not true in the slightest bit, when in fact they have no understanding of the law, or the ramnifications. It will take them losing to fully understand. The radical element goes away very quickly when they have to pay out against others. BTW Canada offers none of the protection that the US does in this arena. Watch how quickly he takes down this posting!. Its is being posted at 1:35pm EDT.

11. Reader's Write Says:
    September 17th, 2006 at 6:22 pm

    I am very happy that Christopher Grell is posting his rant publicly now. On the Healthfraud List where he and Polevoy post regularly, anyone who does not support their biased position is immediately banned. Polevoy threatened one poster with another SLAPP suit already last week on this list.

    For any who haven’t met Christopher Grell before, as a plaintiff, he sued me for “libel” and “conspiracy to libel” when I had never even mentioned his name or knew of his overly litigious nature.

    I will be putting up a website page dedicated to him to respond to the continued propaganda and defamtory posts he places on the internet about me.

    http://www.BreastImplantAwareness.org/ChristopherGrell.htm
    Coming when I catch a moment

    He, like Polevoy, are members of the notorious and discredited “Rag-tag Posse of Snakeoil Vigialantes.” Check it out … that’s what they call themselves.

    http://www.BreastImplantAwareness.org/QuackWatchWatch.htm

    Although he had absolutely no reason in the world to sue me, Grell steadfastly refused to drop his case against me until chided in open court. Judges do not look kindly on attorneys suing people for libel for absolutley no reason.

    From Court documents …

    http://www.casp.net/barrett3.html

    “THE COURT: What is the claim that you have on the merits?”

    “Mr. GRELL: As against Ms. Rosenthal?

    “THE COURT: Yes.

    “MR. GRELL: I don’t believe I have a claim against Ms. Rosenthal.

    “THE COURT: Then why did you sue her?

    ~~~~~~~~~~~

    He dropped the suit the following day, months after he was reminded that he had no claim against me. Keeping activists such as myself defending themselves as defendants in meritless lawsuits is part of the strategy of industry.

    Further, Grell has publicly made what I believe is a libelous claim about me. Repeatedly, he has falsely and without any backing but his delusions and those of his clients, claimed:

    ” …to people like Rosenthal for republishing libelous material that she knows is false.”

    I know nothing of the sort.

    I have clearly outlined my educated beliefs regarding Polevoy’s harassment of Ms McPhee in declarations before the court. Although repeatedly informed that such statements are nonsense, Grell and his team mates continue to repost this libel. Further, no court has ruled that anything I have written or reposted about Grell’s clients is libelous, regardless of their distorted propaganda.

    http://www.BreastImplantAwareness.org/Polevoy.htm

    http://www.BreastImplantAwareness.org/QuackbustersVsIlena.htm

    It should be noted, that Grell’s client, Terry Polevoy, has been outed for donning disguises of a woman on Usenet, to attack me and others in their SLAPP suit. Should Polevoy be the third of the 3 plaintiffs to lose to me in this suit, he may be required by law to pay all of my attorneys fees such as Barrett & Grell have been so ordered to do.

    Ilena Rosenthal
    www.BreastImplantAwareness.org/blog.htm

12. Reader's Write Says:
    September 17th, 2006 at 6:47 pm

    Thanks for explaining that.

    Yes, please send the records to me.

    I’m quite interested.

    Ilena Rosenthal
    www.BreastImplantAwareness.org

13. Reader's Write Says:
    September 17th, 2006 at 7:12 pm

    I knew you wouldn’t miss the chance to jump on the hate wagon
    for your own purposes.

    “People like Jon Newton at p2pnet think they have immunity or the right to make whatever statements they want ”

    jon made no statement, as you well know.
    He posted an article which was posted by several other large
    websites ( none of which were sued ).

    He is being sued for anonymous posts ( like yours ).

    “It will take them losing to fully understand. ”

    He won’t lose.
    If the case was so strong, Sharman networks wouldn’t have
    dropped out of the suit.

    “Watch how quickly he takes down this posting!. Its is being posted at 1:35pm EDT. ”

    Now you’re just flat out lying

    This post will remain, like your other hate filled garbage.

    squish.

    “BTW Canada offers none of the protection that the US does in this arena. ”

    this appears to be true, for now.
    That is why so many canadians are working so hard to fix those
    very broken laws.

14. Reader's Write Says:
    September 17th, 2006 at 8:37 pm

    Mr. Grell,
    As you conveniently fail to mention, most if not all, of the arguments you are still making to justify allowing Polevoy to sue Rosenthal have been almost universally REJECTED by federal courts across the land. The Court of Appeal’s decision on which you depend so heavily stands alone. I read in the papers that the California Supreme Court rebuked you during your presentation of the case that there was a shocking LACK of legal authority supporting Polevoy’s position (made by you) and abundant legal authority supporting Rosenthal.

    Polevoy is still suing Bolen for money because Bolen is the original author of the article which you claim is not true and is libelous. You and Polevoy have yet to prove those claims are true in a court of law. All you have done so far is to just SAY what Bolen wrote is false and defamatory. As a lawyer, you should know it is very easy to say something is true; it is an entirely different matter to prove it in a court of law. I know, life would be so much simpler if juries would just hand a plaintiff a bag of cash based simply on unproven allegations.

    It seems to me that the result of the likelihood that the Supreme Court will reject your arguments and will overrule the Court of Appeal is that it means Polevoy will have one less deep pocket to reach his hands into. Polevoy can still go after Bolen. You may not like it, but we are a nation of laws which are designed for the good of EVERYONE, not just a chosen few. If Congress says you are wrong and Polevoy can’t sue Rosenthal for repeating an article which you CLAIM is libelous, then take it up with Congress, as the Supreme Court suggested. Stop blaming Rosenthal.

    Finally I note that your posting and the many like it commenting on this case over the years have served only to publicize more the allegations about Polevoy. In a way, aren’t you contributing to publicizing the very same allegedly libelous things about Polevoy that you are complaining about?? If Polevoy had sued only Bolen in the first place, and not dragged Rosenthal into the lawsuit, most of us would probably never have heard about Polevoy’s alleged stalking, etc. If the Supreme Court concludes Rosenthal is immune then in a way I guess that helps you, too. What irony eh?

15. Reader's Write Says:
    September 17th, 2006 at 10:02 pm

    Another interestisng point, is that should Polevoy prevail against me, the Quackbuster team has the most to lose.

    http://www.BreastImplantAwareness.org/QuackbustersVsIlena.htm

    Their trademark is to anonymously post libel about their many opponents … and then have others on their team repost the libel.

    Several of Grell and Polevoy’s Rag-tag Posse Teammates used this technique repeatedly, making several libelous comments about me and my non profit foundation.

    Further, should Polevoy prevail and this case returns to Superior Court to discuss the stalking comments, Polevoy’s patterns of donning disguises on Usenet (Vera Teasdale etc. etc. etc. etc.) to attack me and others will be discussed, as well as Ms McPhee’s testimony of the terror she felt during his campaign against her.

    More here:

    http://www.BreastImplantAwareness.org/Polevoy.htm

    Coming soon:

    http://www.BreastImplantAwareness.org/ChristopherGrell.htm

16. Reader's Write Says:
    September 20th, 2006 at 11:23 pm

    ps… I am not your gachnar, but thanks for the compliment:-)

    How come if you are so sure about your position about posts being legal, why not use your real name? I think you are just covering your own personal ass for posting the article in the first place and have caused this whole situation in the first place, and know that in all these cases the real name of the poster always comes out… in NY last week they even tracked a guy who was using a webcafe and had him on camera… there is no anonymity on the web. Thats a fact! Its only a question of how long and how much is it going to cost.
    I am a great believer of Freedom of the Press by the way, it just makes me want to puke when guys like you use it to hide their own personal agenda, and get guys like Jon into trouble and force them to lose everything!

17. Reader's Write Says:
    September 20th, 2006 at 11:26 pm

    Go find your own f^%#*ng site to have your personal battles on!! This is for p2p information! Cant you read the NAME!!!!

18. Reader's Write Says:
    September 21st, 2006 at 4:15 pm

    P2P information is a little more than just about sites and methods,
    especially if you consider the FACT that the entire internet
    is pretty much … P2P. Browsers, FTP ..etc …

    All varying forms of P2P.

    This case, and others like it will have a very LARGE impact on
    the internet ( the most widely used P2P ) as a whole, thus
    having WORLDWIDE impact ( since the largest P2P network,
    the INTERNET, is worldwide ). This makes this pretty damn
    important, as well as Jon’s own case ( very similar, I may add ).

    As for bringing personal battles …..
    It was Mr. Grell who followed her here, to ‘battle’.
    It was actually very peaceful, until he followed her here.
    Very interesting to note that you singled Ilena out for your
    flame, since it takes 2 ( at least ) for any conflict.
    Since her opposition has been proven to hide under other
    identities, I have to wonder

    The story DOES belong here ( just my opinion, of course ).

19. Reader's Write Says:
    September 21st, 2006 at 4:26 pm

    “I am a great believer of Freedom of the Press by the way, it just makes me want to puke when guys like you use it to hide their own personal agenda ”

    You mean, like you are doing, right now ??

    “there is no anonymity on the web. Thats a fact! Its only a question of how long and how much is it going to cost. ”

    You’re right, and that is the crux of the problem.
    This is why large corporations, wealthy business men and
    Politicians can eliminate competition and hide factual information
    that is not favorable to them, simply by using their large cash
    base to use the “legal” system as a club.

    “How come if you are so sure about your position about posts being legal, why not use your real name? ”

    Why don’t you ???
    You see, that “if you have nothing to hide,then you have nothing
    to fear” argument has been used by dictators throughout history.
    The right to privacy SUPPOSEDLY still exists here, but not for
    much longer if folks like you continue to use “fascist speak” under
    the guise of patriotism.

    “I think you are just covering your own personal ass for posting the article in the first place and have caused this whole situation in the first place, ”

    Not sure WHO you are talking to.
    I don’t post ANY articles.
    I express my OPINIONS in the comments sections only.
    As such they are just my OPINIONS, and since I live in a fantasy
    world ..bla bla etc …

    “I am a great believer of Freedom of the Press by the way, ”
    “How come if you are so sure about your position about posts being legal, why not use your real name? ”

    I don’t know whether to puke, laugh, or just shake my head.

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    June 21st, 2008 at 9:25 am

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